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JUSTICE WHITE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: A
MODEL OF REALISM AND RESTRAINT
DavidD. Meyer

Justice Byron White's views on the constitutional right of privacy figure

prominently in almost all assessments of his tenure on the Supreme Court.
To some degree, this only makes sense. The legitimacy of the Court's
intervention to protect unenumerated privacy rights is, after all, often
regarded as the central question of modern constitutional law.1 Yet, for
Justice White's critics, his views on the question have often taken on
singular importance, casting a long, dark shadow over the numerous and
diverse other contributions he made to the Court's jurisprudence during

thirty-one years of service. To these observers, he is remembered first and
foremost for his unyielding rejection of Roe v. Wade,2 and for his majority
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,' which found no fundamental constitutional
right of sexual privacy for homosexuals.4 His opinions in those cases are
regularly featured as exhibits A and B in popular accounts that portray
Justice White as having betrayed the liberal ideals of the Kennedy era:
Justice White as the increasingly conservative curmudgeon on matters of
individual liberty, wielding traditional morality or his own crusty
predilections to repel the claims of modern society.! Indeed, his writing in

+ Professor of Law, University of Illinois; law clerk to Justice White, 1992 Term. I am
grateful to Jim Dwyer, John Goldberg, and the participants in this symposium, as well as
participants in faculty colloquia at William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of Law and the
University of St. Thomas School of Law, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution,72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331,1332-33 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873,873
(1987).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,221 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice White's dissenting opinion applies also to Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
3. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
4. SeeCharles Fried, A Tribute toJusticeByronR. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1,20,26
(1993) (suggesting that Roe and Bowersare "the opinions for which Justice White may well
most be remembered" and that they "earned him many enemies"); Andrew Koppelman, The
Right to Privacy?,2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 105, 116 (suggesting that Bowers "cast a pall on
Byron White's entire judicial career").
5. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Justice,THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 12,1993, at 21,24
(noting "the irony that White, a Kennedy Democrat, voted in 72 percent of the cases last term
with Rehnquist, a Goldwater Republican," and concluding that "White was a follower from
the start" who drifted steadily to the ideological right); DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 444-45 (1998) (noting popular accounts of White as
having disappointed Kennedy ideals); Pierce O'Donnell, Common Sense andthe Constitution-
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Roe and Bowers is said to have precluded President Clinton from saying

much nice about Justice White upon White's retirement from the Court in
1993.6
Less often noted is another line of privacy cases in which Justice White's

views were equally distinctive-those dealing with the rights of unwed
fathers. Beginning with Stanley v. Illinois' in 1972, and continuing through

at least a half-dozen other cases over the following two decades, Justice
White established himself as the most sympathetic member of the Court, or

at least the most vocally sympathetic, to the family yearnings of single men.8
This record, of course, does not fit neatly with the account of White as

exemplar of conservative constitutionalism. But it provides fodder for
another recurring critique of Justice White as the impossible "enigma,"' the
rootless wanderer of constitutional law whose travels simply defied
principled explanation.'0 If traditional morality provided a sufficient
justification for laws penalizing homosexual intimacy, but not for laws

penalizing extramarital relations, the explanation must then lie in Justice
White's own moral sensibilities, which his own opinions strenuously
excluded as a legitimate source of constitutional law."

Justice White and the EgalitarianIdeal,58 U. COLO. L. REV. 433,436 (1987); Fried, supra
note 4, at 20; Koppelman, supra note 4, at 114-16.
6. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 437.
7. 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that an unwed father could not be deprived of
custody of his children without a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent).
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, On GreatnessandConstitutionalVision:
Justice Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 291, 294; Kenneth W. Starr, Justice Byron R.
White: The Last New Dealer,103 YALE L.J. 37, 37 (1993).
10. See HUTCHINSON,supra note 5, at 380 (suggesting that White was "fixed ...in the
popular mind as a justice of unpredictable and indeterminate philosophy," conveying "the
impression of someone mired in detail and careening from one intellectual pew to another");
id. at 440 (quoting a New York Timeseditorialdescribing Justice White, upon his retirement
from the Court, as "'an enigmatic judge whose philosophy has defied tracing even by legal
scholars"'); Fried, supra note 4, at 20-22 & n.8 (asserting that White's positions in cases could
be "clearly, even provocatively, inconsistent" with one another and that "[m]any of Justice
White's detractors emphasize his many apparent inconsistencies"); John C.P. Goldberg,
JudgingReputation: Realism and Common La win Justice White 'sDefamationJurisprudence,
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1473 (2003) (noting the recurring criticism of Justice White as
"unprincipled"); Rosen, supra note 5, at 25 (contending that White's "pragmatism led him to
relish his inconsistencies"); Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the
GreaterIncludesthe Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 232 n.23 ("It is striking to what extent
the standard perception is that White was quite inconsistent...."); Lee & Wilkins, supranote
9, at 295, 299, 302 (noting recurring criticism of White's decisions as lacking "consistency").
11. See Koppelman, supranote 4, at 114-15 (asserting that Bowersrestedon a "judgment
[that] is, of course, the very kind of 'imposition of the Justices' own choice of values' that
Justice White sought to avoid"); Rosen, supra note 5,at 25 (describing Justice White's opinion
in Bowers as both "dishonest[]" and "his most personal").
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I wish to discredit both of these accounts. Justice White's respect for the
democratic process-the stated basis for his views in Roe, Bowers, and
similar cases-was neither cover for his own moral preferences, nor the
product of a late-career ideological conversion. And his willingness to
invalidate certain laws affecting family life, even some nontraditional
conceptions of family life, did not belie his commitment to democratic
choice. In fact, Justice White's approach in these cases might well serve as a
model for how courts should resolve family-privacy disputes in the future. I
say this not because I agree with Justice White's judgment in each of these
cases, nor because I think it impossible to quibble with some of his opinions.
What I find praiseworthy in Justice White's privacy jurisprudence, however,
is the methodologyby which he reached his judgments. It is a methodology
that combines profound and principled respect for the limits of judicial
power with a simultaneous, and equally principled, acceptance of the
propriety of judicial innovation in exceptional cases. Justice White's basic
approach to deciding which cases warranted that innovation-pragmatic,
cautious, attuned to factual nuance, and wary of broad theoretical strokes
and bright-line rules-strikes me as entirely appropriate in the context of
family privacy. It is an approach, moreover, that is both increasingly
reflected in and validated by the Court's privacy jurisprudence in the
decade since Justice White left the bench.
I. DEMOCRACY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY

It is certainly fair to describe Justice White as a privacy skeptic. He was
notably more reluctant than many of his colleagues to embrace an
expansive conception of unenumerated rights under the Constitution. In
rejecting special constitutional protection for certain liberties, such as
abortion, homosexual intimacy, or extended-family living arrangements,
Justice White took care to insist that the outcome was driven not by his
personal preferences on the topic, but rather by a proper understanding of
the modest role assigned to judges in our constitutional democracy.
A. The Place of Judges and the Primacy of DemocraticChoice
Justice White's most famous opinions in the field of privacy each
rejected, in strenuous terms, the claims for constitutional protection. In
1 3
Roe v. Wade, 2 PlannedParenthoodof CentralMissouri v. Danforth,
and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians& Gynecologists,14 he
wrote stinging dissents from decisions protecting the right to abortion.
12. 410 U.S.
410 U.S. 179, 221
13. 428 U.S.
14. 476 U.S.

113 (1973). Justice White's dissent in Roe is reported with Doe v. Bolton,
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
52, 92 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
747, 785 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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Dissenting again in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,5 Justice White insisted
that substantive due process did not protect a grandmother's wishes to live in
an extended-family household encompassing two sets of grandchildren. And
in Bowers v. Hardwick,'6 he led a majority of the Court in repudiating the
suggestion that constitutional privacy demands respect for the sexual
relationship between two men. In each case, however, he was careful to
attribute the rejection to respect for the democratic process, rather than to his
own denigration of the claimants' interests.
In the abortion cases, for example, Justice White claimed to find offensive
not the decision to permit women to elect abortion, but rather that the
judiciary, rather than the democractic process, settled the issue. 7 Dissenting
from Roe v. Wade, he wrote:
The upshot [of the Court's decision] is that the people and the
legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh
the relative importance of the continued existence and development
of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts
on the mother, on the other hand....
The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant
mother more than the continued existence and development of the
life or potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree
with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the Court's
judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such
an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States.'8
White emphasized the same point thirteen years later in his dissent in
Thornburglr "[D]ecisions that find in the Constitution principles or values
that cannot fairly be read into that document," he warned, "usurp the people's
authority, for such decisions represent choices that the people have never
made and that they cannot disavow through corrective legislation."' 9 The
value choice allowing access to abortion could not fairly be read into the
Constitution, he reasoned, because there is "nothing in the language or history
of the Constitution"2" expressing that choice, nor any historical or even
contemporary societal consensus placing the issue beyond the province of
government. 21 "[I]t is ultimately the will of the people that is the source of
whatever values are incorporated in the Constitution," he insisted.22 If a value
choice cannot be traced back to the people in some way-either through
15. 431 U.S. 494, 541 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
19. Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 787 (White, J., dissenting).
20. Doe, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting).
21. See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 793-94 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 796 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
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constitutional text, the "ordered liberty" contemplated by the Constitution's
design, or "'this Nation's history and tradition" -then "the Court engages
not in constitutional interpretation, but in the24 unrestrained imposition of its
own, extraconstitutional value preferences.,
Justice White pointed to precisely the same concerns in explaining why, in
Moore,he found no fundamental right for an extended, multi-generational
family to live together in contravention of a local zoning law that took a
narrower view of "family., 25 A Cleveland suburb had enacted an ordinance
that restricted its residential neighborhoods to "single family" households.
The ordinance then defined "family" in a way that excluded the family of Inez
Moore, a grandmother living with one of her adult sons and with the
grandchildren born to two of her children.26 A majority of the Court
concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional: in the view of Justice
Powell's four-person plurality, because it violated Mrs. Moore's fundamental
privacy right to decide upon her own "family living arrangements";27 and, in
the view of Justice Stevens, because it violated the fundamental right "of an
owner to decide who may reside on his or her property."28
Justice White, however, found no fundamental right implicated by the
zoning law. As in the abortion cases, he disclaimed any conclusion about the
wisdom of the zoning law from a policy standpoint, but insisted that the policy
choice was one left to municipal politics. 29 While acknowledging that past
cases had "extend[ed] substantial protection to various phases of family life,"
Justice White concluded that Mrs. Moore's particular "interest in residing
with more than one set of [her] grandchildren" did not warrant similar
protection.30 His conclusion was not based on an assessment of whether the
nation's history and traditions supported Mrs. Moore's asserted interest-for
he considered the plurality's focus on the nation's "deeply rooted traditions"
too amorphous and manipulable to justify the identification of non-textual
privacy rights.3 Instead, he suggested that Mrs. Moore's interest in
configuring her household as she wished was simply too insubstantial to

23. Id. at 790-91 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
24. Id. at 794 (White, J., dissenting).
25. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,549-51 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 495-97.
27. Id. at 499 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.).
28. Id. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
29. See id. at 550-51 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "[hiad it been our task to
legislate, we might have approached the problem in a different matter than did the drafters of
this ordinance," but concluding that the matter was nevertheless left to rational legislative
discretion).
30. See id.at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
31. See id.at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
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override the presumption in favor of democratic choice as evidenced through
the enacted ordiance.32
Justice White synthesized these views in his opinion for the Court in
Bowers. Again, he began his analysis by disclaiming any personal judgment
on the merits of sodomy laws:
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against
sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between
homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no
question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions to
repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of statecourt decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional
grounds.33
Instead, the sole issue, Justice White insisted, was whether the Constitution
had already removed this question from the field of permissible democratic
debate.34 Considering the "ancient roots" and modern persistence of laws
proscribing homosexual conduct, Justice White concluded, "to claim that a
right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."35
Finding validation of a claimed right in "the concept of ordered liberty" or
in "history and tradition" was essential in order to ensure that judges were not
overstepping their bounds: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."36 If
people come to believe that the Court's constitutional command, overturning
their own democratic choices, rests on nothing more than the Justices'
personal will, the judiciary invites defiance. For White, this had been the
lesson of the Lochner era, in which the Supreme Court enforced the Justices'
own notions of "reasonable" lawmaking under the guise of substantive due
process, invalidating wide swaths of employment and economic regulations
now considered routine and ultimately provoking a humbling "face-off
between the Executive and the Court in the 1930's.'3" By locating unwritten
rights in "deeply rooted" societal consensus or in the implications of the
"ordered liberty" created by the constitutional design, the Court might
"assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in
the Constitution's text involves much more than the imposition of the

32. See id.
at 549-51 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 192-94.
36. Id. at 194.
37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
38. Bowers,478 U.S. at 194-95.
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39
Justices' own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government.,
In the absence of such popular validation, however, "the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express
constitutional authority. 40 This rationale, adopted by a majority in Bowers,
had been the basis for Justice White's dissents in Roe, Thornburgh, and
Moore,often expressed in nearly identical language. 1
That Bowers was of a piece with White's dissents in Moore and the
abortion cases has not slowed critics who have suggested that Bowers'
obeisance to democracy was merely a feint and that the Justice's views in each
case were in truth dictated by his own moral scruples.42 Yet, for Justice White,
respect for the primacy of democratic governance was not a prop
conveniently employed in privacy cases and otherwise set aside. As many
others have observed, judicial deference to democratic rule constitutes a
central theme of Justice White's jurisprudence throughout the whole of his
tenure on the Court. 43 That deference permeated, for example, his opinions

39. Id.at 191-92.
40. Id. at 195.
41. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting) (warning that "[tihe Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution"); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179,222 (1973) ("find[ing] no constitutional warrant for imposing [the Justices' own].
• . order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States"). In his dissent in
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians& Gynecologists, Justice White wrote:
When the Court... defines as "fundamental" liberties that are nowhere mentioned
in the Constitution (or that are present only in the so-called "penumbras" of
specifically enumerated rights), it must, of necessity, act with more caution, lest it
open itself to the accusation that, in the name of identifying constitutional principles
to which the people have consented in framing their Constitution, the Court has
done nothing more than impose its own controversial choices of value upon the
people ....Th[e] utility [of locating unwritten rights in "deeply rooted" societal

consensus or in the design of "ordered liberty"] lies in th[e] effort to identify some
source of constitutional value that reflects not the philosophical predilections of
individual judges, but basic choices made by the people themselves in constituting
their system of government ....
476 U.S. at 790-91 (1986) (White, J., dissenting in part).
42. See, e.g., Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 778 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that
language employed in Justice White's dissenting opinion "reveals that his opinion may be
influenced as much by his own value preferences as by his view about the proper allocation of
decisionmaking responsibilities between the individual and the State"); Rosen, supra note 5, at
25 (labeling Justice White's opinion in Bowers "dishonest[]" and "personal" to the Justice).
43. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, Deference and the Limits to Deference in the
ConstitutionalJurisprudence
of JusticeByron R. White, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 347,347(1987)
("Nothing emerges more clearly from Justice Byron R. White's twenty-five years on the bench
than his persistent deference to the policy judgments made by the legislative and executive
branches of government."); William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002); Kate Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New DealLiberals, 103
YALE L.J. 19, 21-22 (1993); Lee & Wilkins, supranote 9, at 297; Starr, supra note 9, at 38.
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permitting incursions upon the freedom of the press under the First
Amendment, emphasizing "reasonableness" as the touchstone of police
powers under the Fourth Amendment, and ultimately sustaining capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 44 Indeed, as Professors
Hutchinson, Stith, and others have pointed out, the same theme defined
Justice White's first major opinion on the Court.4 ' Dissenting from the
Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a state from
criminalizing the "status" of being a drug addict, White chided the majority
for imposing its own values through the guise of the Eighth Amendment
and for failing to defer to democratically elected policymakers:
I deem this application of "cruel and unusual punishment" so
novel that I suspect the Court was hard put to find a way to
ascribe to the Framers of the Constitution the result reached today
rather than to its own notions of ordered liberty. If this case
involved economic regulation, the present Court's allergy to
substantive due process would surely save the statute and prevent
the Court from imposing its own philosophical predilections upon
state legislatures or Congress. I fail to see why the Court deems it
more appropriate to write into the Constitution its own abstract
notions of how best to handle the narcotics problem, for it
obviously cannot match either the States or Congress in expert
understanding.
The "theme of deference 4 1 was evident in Justice White's nonconstitutional opinions, as well. At his brief Senate confirmation hearing,
Justice White had insisted that "the major instrument for changing the laws
in this country is the Congress of the United States, 46 and his subsequent
approach to interpreting federal enactments, as well as his opinions on
separation of powers and federalism issues, confirmed that belief:
In Justice White's rendition, Congress is the preeminent national
policymaking body. Its capacity to govern must be protected from
executive overreaching, judicial
usurpation, and the
Indeed, colleagues had observed White's commitment to legislative primacy even before he
reached the Court. See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Byron White, 55 STAN. L. REV. 13, 15
(2002) (noting that, as Deputy Attorney General, "Byron had a more conservative view of the
Constitution than many of the activists" and that he struggled "to get the right balance
between a creative use of Executive power and the constitutionally dominant role of

Congress").
44. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 363, 383; William E. Nelson, Justice Byron R.
White:A Modern Federalistand a New DealLiberal,1994 BYU L. REV. 313,336-37.
45.

46.
47.
48.
Cong.,

See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 338, 340; Stith, supra note 43, at 21 n.8.

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting).
Nelson, supra note 43, at 347.
Nomination of Byron R. White: Hearing Before the S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th
2d Sess. 23 (1962).
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encroachments of state governments. Short of the clearest
constitutional restrictions, congressional will should control the
behavior of the executive branch, administrative agencies, and the
49

courts.

As compatriots and commentators have widely observed, the tenets of
Justice White's judicial philosophy accorded closely with the legal realism
that prevailed in the formative years of White's legal education."' In
White's law school days, suspicion of judicial activism was rooted in recent
experience with the abuses of the Lochner era, in which a conservative
Court had stymied the progressive ambitions of the Roosevelt
administration through an expansive conception of substantive due
process." There is every reason to believe that Justice White's professed
respect for the primacy of the democratic political process was entirely
genuine and was, just as he stated, the central explanation for his views
narrowly construing the Court's power to identify and enforce
unenumerated privacy rights under the Constitution. 2
B. Tradition andInnovation in the Protectionof "Liberty"
Notwithstanding his sincere commitment to a modest judicial role in
democratic politics, Justice White signed his name to a significant number
of opinions limiting State power to interfere with family life. He agreed
with the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut," that the Constitution did not
permit Connecticut to outlaw the use of contraceptives by married couples,
and later went along, even if somewhat grudgingly, with an extension of the
same right to unmarried persons.54 He joined majority opinions recognizing
56
a fundamental right to marry in Loving v. Virginia,55 Zablocki v. Redhail,

49. Jonathan D. Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of Federal
Authority,58 U. COLO. L. REV. 371, 372 (1987).
50. See Allan Ides, The JurisprudenceofJustice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419,421-22
(1993); Louis F. Oberdorfer, Justice White and the Yale LegalRealists,103 YALE L.J. 5, 5-6
(1993); Stith, supra note 43, at 20-21.
51. See HUTCHINSON, supranote 5, at 147-57 (describing the intellectual currents of legal

realism at Yale during White's student days); Oberdorfer, supra note 50, at 5; Starr, supranote
9, at 38. See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986).

52. Indeed, there is at least fragmentary evidence refuting the supposition that Justice
White's views in the privacy cases were driven by his personal moral views. According to
Dennis Hutchinson, "he told several law clerks late in his career that if he had been a
legislator he would 'have been pro-choice."' HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 368.
53. 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,702 (1977) (White, J., concurring in

relevant part); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460-65 (1972) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
55. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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and Turner v. Safley7 And, finally, he was outspoken in asserting the

constitutional rights of unwed fathers to establish and maintain

relationships with their children. 8 Justice White may have been a privacy

skeptic, but he clearly was not a privacy opponent. Indeed, it is not too
much to observe, as Dennis Hutchinson has, that "[t]he sanctity of the

family structure, as he conceived it, was central to Byron White as a
judge."59 A brief review of his position in a range of cases for which he is
less often remembered confirms that he was quite willing to wield

constitutional

notions of privacy, sometimes even in defense of

unconventional family relationships.
In Griswold,Justice White declined to join Justice Douglas' majority
opinion, with its expansive forays into penumbras of the Bill of Rights and6

its open-ended declaration of an implied fundamental "right of privacy."

0

Characteristically, he preferred to hew closer to the facts of the case,

concluding, more narrowly, that Connecticut's stated interest in an acrossthe-board ban on contraceptive use-deterring sexual relations outside of

marriage-could not justify the statute's ban on contraceptive use within
marriage.6' Importantly, however, Justice White accepted the premise of
substantive due process generally, 6 and agreed specifically that "the

intimacies of the marriage relationship,

63

were entitled to heightened

judicial protection:
Surely the right invoked in this case, to be free of regulation of the

intimacies of the marriage relationship, "come[s] to this Court
with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties

which

derive

merely

from

shifting

economic

arrangements."
...

[S]tatutes regulating sensitive areas of liberty do, under the

cases of this Court, require "strict scrutiny" ....
57. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
58. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,648-49 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
268 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting). Cf Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 361 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
59. HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 372.
60. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
61. See id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. See id. at 504 n.* (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. Id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
64. Id. at 502-04 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In subsequent opinions, Justice
White reiterated his belief that the Constitution gives heightened protection to marital
privacy. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64 (1972) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Our general reluctance to question a State's judgment on matters of public health
must give way where.., the restriction at issue burdens the constitutional right of married
persons to use contraceptives."); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynelogists, 476
U.S. 747, 802 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("conced[ing] that the Constitution extends its
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Similarly, in Loving, Zablocki,and Safley, Justice White readily accepted
the existence of a fundamental constitutional right to marry, one that was
entitled to aggressive judicial protection through the guise of substantive
due process.
In Eisenstadt v. Bairdand Carey v. PopulationServices International,
Justice White again voted with the majority. 5 As in Griswold,however, he
66
wrote separately to advance a narrower basis for the Court's judgment.
The majority in Eisenstadtreadilyextended the privacy right recognized in
Griswold to unmarried couples, on the rationale that "[ilf the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."67 Justice White concurred in the judgment invalidating a
Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives, but on a rationale
that required no enlargement of Griswold because the record failed to
establish the marital status of those involved in the transaction at issue, the
criminal conviction might be invalidated on the strength of Griswold
alone.68
Five years later, when the Court returned to a similar issue in Carey,
White was ready to go along, though with some qualifications. He
concurred in most of the majority opinion striking down a New York statute
regulating the distribution of contraceptives and banning the distribution
altogether to minors under the age of sixteen." He specifically joined the
portion of Justice Brennan's majority opinion that recognized "the
underlying premise" of Eisenstadt and Griswold to be "that the
Constitution protects 'the right of the individual . . . to be free from

unwarranted governmental intrusion into ... the decision whether to bear
and beget a child,"'7 and stated that, "[g]iven Eisenstadtand given the
decision of the Court in the abortion case, Roe v. Wade,"7 he agreed that
New York's law was invalid.
The reason Justice White qualified his approval of the Court's rationale
in Eisenstadtand Carey is evident. On several occasions, Justice White
made clear that he assumed the constitutional validity of laws regulating
sexual conduct outside of marriage. In his opinion for the Court in
protection to certain zones of personal autonomy and privacy") (citing White's separate
opinion in Griswold).
65. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 439; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,680 (1976).

66. See supranote 61.
67. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
68. See id. at 464-65 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. Carey,431 U.S. at 680-81.
70. Jd. at 687.
71. Id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part).
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McLaughlin v. Florida,2 striking down a law criminalizing interracial
cohabitation on equal-protection grounds, he signaled approval of other,
race-neutral portions of Florida's law, which punished premarital and
extramarital sexual relations. The latter provisions, he wrote, furthered "a
valid state interest" favoring marriage.73 Again, in his separate opinion in
Griswold,Justice White conceded that "the State's policy against all forms
of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or
extramarital, [was] ... a permissible and legitimate legislative goal. 74 In
finally assenting, in Carey,to Eisenstadt'srecognition of a constitutional
right for unmarried individuals to use contraception, he stipulated his
understanding that the Court's holding did not "declar[e] unconstitutional
any state law forbidding extramarital sexual relations."75 Indeed, White
added that the suggestion that minors might be constitutionally entitled to
use contraceptives "'notwithstanding the combined objection of both
parents and the State"' was, quite simply, "'frivolous.' 76 Despite the
decidedly qualified nature of his support for the Court's extension of
privacy rights to unmarried persons, White nevertheless found himself on
the receiving end of the very sort of criticism he was more accustomed to
hurling at the Court: Chief Justice Burger accused Justice White's separate
opinion in Eisenstadt of "seriously invad[ing] the constitutional
prerogatives of the States77and regrettably hark[ing] back to the heyday of
substantive due process.,
Although Justice White was reluctant to find special constitutional
protection for sexual activity outside of marriage, he felt no such
compunction about conferring protection upon the parent-child
relationships that might result from that activity. In Stanley v. Illinois,6 he
wrote for the Court, invalidating an Illinois statute that automatically
deprived unwed fathers of the custody of their children upon the death of
the children's mother.79 Under the Illinois law, unwed fathers were not
recognized as legal parents and, therefore, the death of the children's
mother-their only legal parent-rendered the children wards of the State. so
The Court held that this law, which it characterized as effecting a conclusive

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Stevens,
77.
78.

379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 196.
381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Carey,431 U.S. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part).
Id.at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in part) (quoting the concurring opinion of Justice
431 U.S. at 713).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,467 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
405 U.S. 645 (1972).

79. Id.at 649.

80.

Id. at 646.
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presumption that all unwed fathers are unfit parents, denied both due
process and equal protection:
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has
sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection ....
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have
been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious ... than property

rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)."

On the basis of this precedent, recognizing the fundamental right of parents
to rear their children, Stanley held that Illinois could not preclude unwed
fathers from establishing their fitness to have custody of their children."
Justice White pressed the same theme in a series of subsequent cases. He
joined the Court's opinions in Quilloin v. Walcot 3 and Caban v.
Mohammed, which recognized similar limitations on the use of adoption
laws to strip unwed fathers of parental status, at least when the father, as in
85
Stanley,had taken an active role in raising his children. And he dissented
86
strongly from later decisions, in Lehr v. Robertson and Michael H. v.
87 which upheld statutory devices that denied parental status to
GeralD.,
certain unwed fathers.
Lehrinvolved a New York statute that made an unwed biological father's
right to be notified when a third party sought to adopt his child dependent
upon whether he had registered as a "putative father" with a state agency.88
81. Id. at 651.
82. Id. at 649.
83. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
84. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
85. In Ouiloin, a unanimous Court held that the Due Process Clause permitted Georgia
to grant an adoption of a child solely upon a finding that the adoption would serve the child's
"best interests," even though the result was to deprive the child's unwed biological father of

any claim of parenthood. 434 U.S. at 254, 256. The next year, the Court came to a different
result in Caban, holding that the Equal Protection Clause would not permit New York to
similarly disregard the parental status of an unwed father who had lived with his children and
played a substantial role in rearing them. 441 U.S. at 389.
86. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
87. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
88. 463 U.S. at 250-51 & n.4. The statute made an exception for certain unwed fathers,

such as those named on the child's birth certificate or those who lived with the child and the
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Jonathan Lehr had not registered his claim to parenthood, and so the law
allowed the adoption of his daughter without any finding concerning his
fitness and, indeed, without even giving him notice of the proceeding.8 9 The
Court upheld the constitutionality of the registry requirement, distinguishing
Stanley and Caban on the ground that the existence of an unwed father's
"'substantive due process right to maintain his... parental relationship"'"
depended upon whether he had "demonstrate[d] a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child."' 9' Lehr failed this test, the Court ruled, because he had
"never supported and rarely seen [his daughter] in the two years since her
birth" ' and had shirked even the minimal duty of "mailing a postcard to the
putative father registry" to indicate his parental interest. 93 Accordingly, the
Constitution permitted the state to disregard Lehr as a parent in the adoption
proceeding.
Justice White disagreed. In his view, an unwed father's liberty interest in
parenthood was established solely by his genetic tie to the child, quite apart
from whether he had developed an emotional relationship with the child.
"The 'biological connection,"' he wrote, "is itself a relationship that creates a
protected interest., 94 After all, "'the usual understanding of "family" implies
biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relation between
parent and child have stressed this element.' 95 Moreover, even accepting the
majority's conception of unwed fathers' rights as contingent upon their
responsible conduct, Justice White criticized the majority's implication that
Lehr had demonstrated only minimal interest in his daughter. Pointing to
Lehr's allegations that the mother had thwarted his repeated attempts to
support and interact with his daughter, Justice White concluded: "This case
requires us to assume that Lehr's allegations are true-that but for the actions
of the child's mother there would have been the kind of significant
relationship that the majority concedes is entitled to the full panoply of
procedural due process protections."' 96

child's mother and held themselves out as the child's father. Id at 251. Otherwise, an unwed
father's participation in an adoption proceeding involving his child depended upon timely
registration with the putative father registry. Id.

89. Id. at 250.
90. Id. at 260 (quoting Caban,441 U.S. at 397).
91.

Id. at 261 (citations omitted).

92. Id. at 249-50.
93. Id.at 264.
94.

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 272 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).

95. Id.(White, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,843
(1977)).
96. Id. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
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Justice White was similarly sympathetic to the claims of another unwed
father in Michael H. v. Gerald D.9' In that case, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a California law that prevented a man from establishing
his paternity of a child conceived in an extramarital affair with a married
woman.9 8 The father had lived off and on with the mother after the birth of
their daughter, Victoria, and had held her out as his child.99 After the mother
reconciled with her husband and announced her intention to cut off contact
between Victoria and the father, he found that his effort to establish legal ties
was precluded by a conclusive statutory presumption recognizing the mother's
husband as the child's father.' He challenged the constitutionality of the law,
contending that the state lacked a compelling justification for depriving him of
his fundamental right to a relationship with his daughter.'
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion rejected the notion that Michael H. had a
fundamental liberty interest in the relationship with his daughter and did so
largely on the basis of history. To be ranked as "fundamental," an "asserted
liberty interest [must] be rooted in history and tradition"-iLe., the particular
family interest must have been "traditionally protected by our society" against
state interference. 112 From this point of view, Michael H.'s claim bordered on
the preposterous:
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the
relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and
Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society .... We think it impossible to find
that it has.' °3
Indeed, not only had society not "accorded traditional respect" to the ties4
arising from such extramarital affairs, it actively condemned them."
Accordingly, neither Michael nor Victoria had any constitutional privacy
interest at stake and it was therefore "a question of legislative policy and not
constitutional law" whether to permit their relationship to continue.' °5
Again, Justice White dissented. In his view, the Constitution's protection of
the family relationship asserted by Michael H. turned not solely on its
historical claim to veneration, but on its substantiality in the here and now.
97.

98.
99.
100.

491 U.S. 110 (1989).

Id. at 118-30.
Id.at 113-14.
Id. at 116. The presumption could be rebutted only by the mother or her husband,

but not by others outside the marriage. See id at 117-18 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621

(West Supp. 1989)).
101. Id. at 119-21.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 122-23 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
Id.at 124.
See id.
Id at 129-31.
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Under Lehr and Caban, "'[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to
participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with
' 6
his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.'
In this case, Michael H. had lived with and supported his daughter to the
extent that her mother would permit; he had developed an "emotional
relationship" with Victoria, "who grew up calling him 'Daddy."' 7 It was
true enough that their contact had been intermittent, "but in light of
Carole's vicissitudes, what more could Michael have done?"", For Justice
White, the constitutional test in Lehrand MichaelH could not rest solely
on abstractions or the happenstance of history; it had to be responsive to
the real-world dilemmas of the individuals affected by the Court's
judgments. Having done everything he reasonably could to "'grasp[] th[e]
opportunity"' for responsible parenthood, Michael H. was constitutionally
entitled to "'enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship." "' ' 9
II.

CONSISTENCY AND CONSENSUS IN THE SEARCH FOR "FAMILY"

Even to some friendly analysts, the pattern of Justice White's opinions in
the family-privacy cases suggests "an inconsistency in White's
jurisprudence: the stickler for law, with little patience for social engineering,
could vote and speak like a legislator in areas touching the family.""0 The
criticism is certainly plausible; how could the Justice who had condemned
the judicial imposition of value judgments in Moore and the abortion cases
mandate democratic obeisance to marriage and contraception? How could
the Justice who had been so sensitive to the human dilemmas facing unwed
fathers, overlooking traditional moral objections to vindicate their parental
aspirations, find traditional morality to be a sufficient basis for laws
effectively criminalizing homosexuality?
My view is that Justice White's opinions do not ultimately suggest an
inconsistency. To the contrary, his views in these cases can be understood as
the products of a single methodology, faithfully applied. Further, I believe
that this methodology, born of Justice White's foundational commitments to
restraint and realism in constitutional adjudication, could well serve as a
model for the Court's approach to family-privacy cases in the future.
Before turning to a more full consideration of this methodology, I should
first acknowledge and set aside two alternative rationales by which Justice
106. Id.at 160 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)
and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
107. Id. at 159 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id.at 160 (White, J., dissenting).
109. See id.at 163 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262).
110. HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 371.
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White's privacy opinions might be harmonized. First, it may be argued that
there is no conflict between White's seemingly more expansive approach to
privacy in the contraception and unwed father cases and his narrower
approach in Moore and the abortion cases on the ground that the former
cases did not actually entail any extension of substantive "privacy" rights. It is
true, for example, that the Court's judgments in these cases, or White's
dissents, were often grounded in equal protection (as in Eisenstadt,
Zablocki,and Caban) or procedural due process (as in Stanley, Lehr, and
MichaelH.),rather than in the substantive due process protection of privacy.
Nevertheless, the distinction does not seem persuasive because the
vindication of the constitutional claim in each case required the recognition of
specially protected liberty interests relating to family privacy. White's view in
each case resulted in not merely a mandate of equal treatment or fair process,
but the imposition of a new substantive limitation on state power to invade
the asserted liberty. Indeed, the Court collectively, or Justice White
individually, often acknowledged as much in subsequent cases.
Eisenstadt, for example, held that equal protection required that
unmarried persons enjoy the same access to contraception as married
persons.' Given Griswolds prior recognition that married couples have a
substantive privacy right to use contraception together, this amounted to
recognition that unmarried persons also have a substantive privacy right to
contraception.
Later, both the Court and Justice White readily
acknowledged that "the underlying premise" of Eisenstadt was a
recognition that "the Constitution protects 'the right of the individual ... to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into ... the decision

whether to bear or beget a child."' 2 Similarly, Zablocki subjected a law
restricting access to marriage to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, but did so on the ground that the law drew classifications
with respect to the exercise of the fundamental privacy right to marry-a
substantive due process right Justice White had already directly
acknowledged in Loving v. Virginia.
Stanley v. Illinois, and White's dissents in Lehr and MichaelH., were
couched in the language of procedural due process. Yet, in each, the
111, See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that "whatever the rights of
the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the
unmarried and the married alike").
112. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (majority opinion of
Brennan & White, JJ.) (quoting Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453); see also Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (listing Eisenstadt among the
Court's decisions recognizing a substantive due process right of privacy). As the Court
recently acknowledged in Lawrence v. Texas, Eisenstadt"was decided under the Equal
Protection Clause, but with respect to unmarried persons, the Court went on to state the
fundamental proposition that the law impaired the exercise of their personal rights." 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003) (citing Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 454).
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entitlement to process rested on the invalidation of a substantive rule of
law. In Stanley, the State of Illinois had decided as a matter of state policy
to deny parental status to unwed biological fathers."3 The Court's judgment
held that this policy was impermissible given the Constitution's solicitude
for the rights of parents." The Court's holding that Peter Stanley was
entitled to a hearing before he could be deprived of custody necessarily
carried with it a mandate that Illinois cede a substantive legal entitlement as
well-namely, that unwed fathers be entitled to state recognition as parents
and to custody of their children upon proof of their "fitness"; otherwise, the
evidentiary hearing would have no legal consequence." 5 As Justice White
later acknowledged, Stanleydid more than dictate a measure of process; it
"recognized the biological father's right to a legal relationshipwith his
6
illegitimate child."''

For Justice White, the claims of the men in Lehrand MichaelH.rested
upon precisely the same principle. Although in those cases, New York and
California sought to exclude certain men from the realm of parenthood-in
Lehr, those whose ties with a child were so attenuated that they had not
even gone to the trouble of mailing a postcard to the state's putative father
registry, and, in Michael H., those who sought to press their interest in
parenthood upon an intact marital family-Justice White considered these
policy judgments constitutionally intolerable."7 In his view, if these men had
done all they reasonably could to assume responsibility for the child, the
state was constitutionally required to give them not only a chance to prove
their good conduct, but ultimately the very "'blessings of the parent-child
relationship."' " Accordingly, Justice White's views in these cases cannot
be reconciled with his privacy skepticism in Moore and Roe on the tidy
ground that these cases involved merely equal protection or procedural due
process. It remains that, notwithstanding his skepticism in Moore and Roe,
he accepted the premise of heightened substantive protection for privacy
and was willing to extend privacy protection beyond the confines of the
traditional marital family.
Alternatively, it might be argued that Justice White's views in the various
privacy cases can be harmonized by resort to a broader notion of family
tradition. Perhaps his willingness to find privileged privacy interests, even
113. 405 U.S.645,646(1972).
114. Id. at 649-51.
115. Seeid.at649.
116. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 158 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); accordid at 120-21 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (contending that the Court's holding
in Stanleyrestedon substantive, rather than procedural, due process).
117. Seeid.at 157 (White, J., dissenting); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,273-75 (1983)
(White, J.,
dissenting).
118. Michaelf., 491 U.S. at 163 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Lehr,463 U.S. at 262).
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in the seemingly more novel contexts of non-marital or extra-marital
childbearing, was consistently grounded in an assessment of the nation's
"deeply rooted" social traditions, but simply defined at a broader level of
generality than favored by some. " 9 For instance, judicial recognition of the
fundamental parental rights of unwed fathers might be justified by society's

longstanding veneration of "parenthood" even though it would be quite
untenable to claim that society had historically respected the ties between
children and their unwed fathers specifically."'

This theory of Justice White's rationale appears implausible for at least
two reasons. First, although he ultimately came to accept the nation's
"deeply rooted" traditions as a basis for recognizing fundamental
constitutional rights,' White was initially suspicious of this rationale for
substantive due process. In Moore,for example, he expressly shunned this
approach on the ground that it opened the door to hidden judicial
manipulation. 22 Second, Justice White's record in other cases, including
Bowers and Moore,'24 seems squarely at odds with an abstract, highly
119. See id. at 127-28 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (urging the framing of claimed
liberty interests in specific terms when searching for evidence that society has traditionally
regarded the liberty as fundamental); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-80 (1991) (discussing the significance of the choice of

generality or specificity in framing a claimed right).
120. Cf MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (acknowledging,
but rejecting this suggestion). For evidence demonstrating that the claim of historical respect
for unwed fatherhood would be plainly unsupportable, see David D. Meyer, Family Ties.:
Solving the ConstitutionalDilemma of the FaultlessFather,41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753,758-59 &
n.10 (1999). Justice Scalia attempted a similar maneuver to rationalize the Court's holdings in
Stanley, Caban, and Lehrwith respect for societal tradition, attributing the results in those
cases to "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally
accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family," by which he meant an
intact nuclear (even if non-marital) family. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion). Whatever the persuasiveness of this effort, ef id. at 143-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
it cannot clearly explain Justice White's understanding of those cases, given that he thought
these cases required extension to the facts of MichaelH.as well. See id. at 160 (White, J.,
dissenting).
121. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,192,194 (1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790-91 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
122. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 491,549-50 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
("For me, this [approach] suggests a far too expansive charter for this Court... [in relation to]
substantive due process review. What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is
arguable.").
123. CompareBowers,478 U.S. at 190 (White, J., majority opinion) ("The issue presented
is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy .... ), with id. at 199, 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that the issue is
whether there is a fundamental right of "sexual intimacy" generally, not "homosexual
sodomy" specifically).
124. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50 (White, J., dissenting) (framing the claimed right in
terms of Mrs. Moore's "interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren" and
concluding that, "because of the nature of that particular interest," substantive due process
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general approach to rights-framing.'2 Accordingly, White's privacy views
cannot be harmonized on this rationale.
Instead, if Justice White's privacy views are to be defended as principled
and consistent, it must be with reference to some other theory. The theory
that ultimately explains Justice White's voting posits that substantive due
process protection in this context is bottomed not on history or tradition,
nor solely on a judicial assessment of the substantiality of the private
interest at stake, but rather on a determination of whether the asserted
interest corresponds with accepted notions of what makes familyspecially
valuable. This entails a normative judgment, but that alone does not render
it inconsistent with Justice White's opposition to the Court's judgments in
Moore and the abortion cases. It would be a mistake to read White's
opinions in those cases for the proposition that normative judgment is
impermissible in constitutional adjudication. To the contrary, Justice White
made clear that he thought normative judgment both inevitable and, more
to the point, appropriate in constitutional interpretation to the extent that
the judgment was tempered by genuine judicial humility and self-restraint
and accorded roughly with modern social consensus.' 6
Justice White's methodology in these cases can be traced to at least three
foundations of his judicial philosophy: realism, restraint, and pragmatism.
As already noted, Justice White received his legal education in an
environment steeped in legal realism. ' A central "reality" accepted by that
movement was that judges' interpretation of law is inevitably influenced to
some degree by their experiences, world views, and biases. 26 On this point,
ample evidence exists to show that White agreed.' 29 As Professor Stith
observed, "White always understood that judges make law."' 3 To him, it
would have been fanciful to pretend that the meaning of the law, and
required only rational basis review); id.at 547 ("[T]he issue is whether the precise interest
involved-the interest in having more than one set of grandchildren live in her home-is
entitled to such substantive protection under the Due Process Clause that this ordinance must
be held invalid.").
125. For additional examples, see Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that abusive parental discipline of children could not be considered included
within the scope of a parent's fundamental right of childrearing); seegenerallyReno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by White, J.) (finding no fundamental right for a child in
state detention to reside with extended-family members in lieu of institutional care).

126. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
127.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

128.

See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65-71 (1995).

129. See Stith, supranote 43, at 20.
130. Id.; accord Herz, supra note 10, at 232 ("In short, [White] consistently went along
with an image of the judiciary that is a good deal closer to the model of a legislature-

representative policymakers who decide matters prospectively and without regard for prior
decisions-than the 'official version' would have it. This version is, of course, that of the
realists.").
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particularly the Constitution, is determinate and reliably ascertainable by
faithful consultation of text or history."3' Crucially, White did not merely
accept the realist notion that judicial behavior is influenced by experience
and perspective, but also that, in appropriate measure, it shouldbe.1 2 As
White explained in his Thornburghdissent: "The Constitution is not a deed
setting forth the precise metes and bounds of its subject matter; rather, it is
a document announcing fundamental principles in value-laden terms that
leave ample scope for the exercise of normative judgment by those charged
with interpreting and applying it."'33 The scope of permissible normative
judgment was not simply confined to giving specific content to vague textual
' 34
phrases, such as deciding which searches or seizures were "unreasonable'
or which punishments were "cruel and unusual."'35 It extended as well, to
the recognition of limitations on state authority that lack any direct textual
hook. Thus, White accepted the concept of substantive due process
and,
36
inescapably, that the concept would have normative content.
At the same time, Justice White was clearly influenced by the realists'
sensitivity to the potential for abuse of judicial power. The legal realism
movement, after all, had been "ignited" by Lochnerandfueled by repulsion
to the way in which the Supreme Court had obstructed democratic
innovation during the New Deal.' This perspective combined a powerful
wariness of judicial adventurism with a profound faith in the capacity of
democratic institutions. And, as others have persuasively demonstrated,
this perspective is readily apparent across the full range of White's

131. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 789
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting "the simplistic view that constitutional interpretation
can possibly be limited to the 'plain meaning' of the Constitution's text or to the subjective
intention of the Framers"); see also id. at 796 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (reiterating his

"recognition that constitutional analysis requires more than mere textual analysis or a search
for the specific intent of the Framers").

132. See Ides, supranote 50, at 426-27 (suggesting that "White's approach to separation of
powers conforms with the legal realist tenet that law ought to reflect the reality of changing
social conditions").
133. 476 U.S. at 789 (White, J., dissenting).
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
135. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
136. See, e.g., Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 789-90 (White, J., dissenting); see also Moore v.
City of E.Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 547-49 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Lance Liebman, A
Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1,15-16 (1993) (stating that White was
"clear about the availability-in limited circumstances to be sure-of substantive due
process").
137. HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 152-53; see also Oberdorfer, supranote 50, at 5
(stating that Justice White was a critical observer of the Supreme Court during the New Deal
years); Starr, supra note 9, at 38 (opining that "perhaps we are returning to the underlying
ideals of Justice White's world, the New Deal-government can and should solve the
problems of the people").
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jurisprudence. 38 It was this assessment of the competing competencies of
courts and majoritarian organs of government that led Justice White to
emphasize the danger of judicial overreaching, and the consequent need for
judicial restraint, as "[a] recurring theme of his opinions."'3 9
White's pragmatism forms a third and final foundation of White's privacy
methodology. Scholars and colleagues have universally described White's
approach to legal questions as either functional or pragmatic.' 40 The
following account, though written to describe pragmatism in constitutional
law generally, may as well be describing Justice White's interpretive
approach in particular:
[Pragmatism] is perhaps chiefly defined.., by its skepticism of the
ability of grand theory or foundational principles to solve the hard
questions of constitutional law .... Pragmatists are often inclined
to recognize the usefulness or partialvalidityof many theories-to
admit, for instance, the relevance of original intent or of
embedded historical values-but to deny that any one of these
theories adequately accounts for the complexity and difficulty of
many constitutional questions. Instead, ever wary of bright lines,
pragmatism calls on judges to draw on all available sources of
wisdom, both theoretical and empirical, to arrive at a practical
judgment that fits the facts of each case.141
For Justice White, the elegance of a legal theory was always an insufficient
basis for validating a claim or doctrine; instead, legal rules were ultimately
tested by how they worked on the ground, in the complications of the real
world.142 Abstractions were never so persuasive as facts. As Allan Ides put
138. See Liebman, supranote 136, at 17 ("Justice White was a democrat, committed to a
healthy political process and ready to allow that process to work."); Nelson, supranote 43, at
348 (explaining that White's decisions "reflect the legal realist notion that definitive legal
rules-and hence definitive legal rights-do not exist, that all results are a product of policy
choices made by various branches of government, and that, to the greatest extent possible,
policy choices ought to be made by legislative or executive officials chosen by and responsible
to the majority of the electorate"); Stith, supra note 43, at 21 ("White's confidence in the good
faith and capabilities of democratic institutions - Congress, especially, but also the President,
state legislatures, and juries-exceeded that of other Justices on the 'left' or the 'right.');
Starr, supranote 9, at 38 (suggesting that "Justice White may well have been the last true
believer in government").
139. Stith, supra note 43, at 21; see also Bernard W. Bell, Byron R. White, Kennedy
Justice,51 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1380-94 (1999).
140. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 10, at 227 ("agreeing with the usual portrait of White as a
pragmatic functionalist"); Ides, supranote 50, at 422,428,432,437-38; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A
Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1,2 (1993); Stith, supranote 43, at 19,
31.
141. David D. Meyer, ConstitutionalPragmatismfor a Changing American Family,32
RUTGERS L.J. 711, 722-23 (2001) (emphasis in original).
142. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 339-40 (noting that White "believed that police
behavior should be understood by practical considerations and not by dogmatic
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it, "the foundation of Justice White's jurisprudence was realism rooted in
the belief that law should reflect a pragmatic appraisal of the circumstances
to which the law is to be applied."'' 3 A natural result of this approach is a
preference for cautious incrementalism in judicial interpretation. An
affinity for grand theory or abstraction may lead to sweeping
pronouncements of legal principle; close attention to the facts, however,
tends to cabin the implications of a decision. Time and again, Justice White
avoided broad, theoretical bases for decision when a narrow, fact-specific
rationale would suffice.' 44
These three commitments in Justice White's jurisprudence-realism,
restraint, and pragmatism- help to explain the pattern of his decisions in the
context of family privacy. Restraint dominated in Moore45 and the abortion
cases; but his realistic acceptance of the role of normative judgment permitted
White to go along with the Court's privacy judgments relating to marriage and
contraception and to push the Court even farther with respect to unmarried
fathers. What led White to emphasize restraint in one case or realism in the
next was not his own predilections concerning policy.' 46 Indeed,
it is quite
' 1417
plausible that White might have sided with the claimants in Roe, Moore,
and Bowers48 had the controversies come before him as a legislator.
Whatever his own moral attitude toward abortion or homosexuality, Justice
White might well have favored decriminalization of both as a policy matter,
49
though he did not believe that policy choice was constitutionally required.
Nor wereWhite's judgments controlled by fealty to tradition. Though it is
sometimes said that White's privacy decisions hewed closely to traditional
notions of family, his position in the unwed-father cases and, perhaps, in
Eisenstadi5 ° and Care 5' seems to refute the claim.
presumptions"); id. at 399 (describing White as a "devotee of functional analysis of the
administrative state"); Goldberg, supra note 10 (noting that "White emphasiz[ed] the actual
and concrete over the theoretical and the abstract"); Nelson, supra note 44, at 319 ("Justice
White's 'focus on the actual operation of the law' rather than on theory and technicality is so
clear and so widely accepted that no need exists to dwell on it at length."); Kate Stith, Justice
White and the Law, 112 YALE L.J. 993, 994 (2003) (noting that White "had no patience for

intellectual vogues or for theory unmoored from facts and from context").
143. Ides, supranote 50, at 456
144.

See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 339; Bell, supra note 139, at 1395-96; Liebman,

supra note 136, at 19.
145. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
146. Cf HUTCHINSON, supranote 5, at 371 (suggesting that White "could vote and speak
like a legislator in areas touching the family").
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
148. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
149. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 5, at 368 (noting that White reportedly confided to
some law clerks that he would have voted "pro-choice" on the question of abortion as a

legislator).
150. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460-65 (1972).
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What seems to have driven Justice White's decision in these cases was
practical judgment about whether the private interest at stake shared in the
core values that define and distinguish family life as a specially privileged
"'private realm . . . which the state cannot enter.'' 2 This latter
determination did not turn solely on whether the specific family relationship
or decision at issue enjoyed longstanding historical veneration, as Justice
Scalia would have it.153 Nor was it sufficient for "fundamental" privacy
protection, under White's approach, to adjudge that the private interest at
stake was profoundly important rto the154affected individual, the usual focus
for Justices Blackmun and Brennan.
In typical pragmatic fashion, the
contours of tradition and the substantiality of the private interest were both
relevant to the ultimate judgment for Justice White. These factors,
however, must be paired with a normative validation of the claimed interest
as within popular understanding of the social good of family. When the
Court finds a private interest in making certain family decisions to be
"fundamental," White explained, "it is not only because those decisions are
'serious' and 'important' to the individual, but also because some value of
privacy or individual autonomy that is somehow implicit in the scheme of
ordered liberties established by the Constitution supports a judgment that
such decisions are none of government's business.' ' 55
So validated,
aggressive judicial protection could be considered legitimate by Justice
White because the value choice advanced by intervention
could then be
56
judges.1
to
than
rather
people
the
to
attributed
Understood in this light, Justice White's positions in the privacy cases
take on considerable order and consistency, suggesting ultimately a
distinctive understanding of the sort of familyvalued by the Constitution.
The cases finding special Due Process protection for marriage are the most
57
easily explained. The marital union protected in Griswold,'
Loving,55

151. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702-03 (1977).
152. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
153. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
154. See e.g., id.at 142-46 (Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J.).
155. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2
(1986) (White, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
156. As White explained in Thornburgh,this attribution was essential to the legitimacy of
judicial intervention: "[1]t
is ultimately the will of the people that is the source of whatever
values are incorporated in the Constitution ....[C]onstitutional adjudication is a search for

values ... that are implicit (and explicit) in the structure of rights and institutions that the
people have themselves created." 476 U.S. at 796 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
158. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Zablocki, 5 9 and Turner plainly shares in the essential values that define a
family. Indeed, given the longstanding common understanding of marriage

as the very "foundationof the family,' ' 16' the Court had every assurance that
its intervention in defense of marital intimacy vindicated core values
implicit in the social institution of family.
The unwed father cases presented a closer question for many of Justice
White's colleagues. Unmarried fathers had long and widely been excluded

from legal definitions of family, making it untenable to ground
constitutional protection in a traditional consensus that government had no
business regulating the relationships between these men and their children.
Yet Justice White displayed no hesitation in extending constitutional
protection. Instinctively and pragmatically, he appeared to see the essential
connection between the yearnings of these men for a caregiving relationship
with their children and the indisputably precious bonds between parents

and children in the marital family. In Peter Stanley

'

162

and Abdiel Caban,

161

it was possible to see emotional commitment and a loving assumption of

responsibility that bore an essential similarity with that which distinguished
and privileged the parent-child relationship in more conventional settings;
in Jonathan Lehr' 64 and Michael H., White saw men who plausibly claimed

to have done everything reasonably possible to manifest the same
commitment. 6 6 Although different in form, the emotional substance of
these relationships, therefore, could be seen to draw on the core social

values of family. And, as White appeared to accept elsewhere, the personal
andsocial value of family "stems [largely] from the emotional attachments
'
that derive from the intimacy of daily association."167
Justice White's grudging acceptance of a privacy interest in contraception

among unmarried couples might be understood on a similar rationale. Sexual
159. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
160. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
161. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,211 (1888) (emphasis added).
162. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
163. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
164. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
165. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
166. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347,366-68 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting
to a categorical exclusion of unwed fathers who failed to legitimate their children from
recovery in wrongful-death actions on the ground that some such fathers have emotional
relationships that are as close and substantial as other, legally recognized parent-child
relationships, and taking note of the growing prevalence of non-marital families).
167. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
(Brennan, J., joined by White, J.) ("[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life'
through the instruction of children.") (citation omitted).
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relations outside of marriage could hardly claim historical veneration, yet
Eisenstadt and Carey did at least involve claims for intimate human
connection. Of course, the choice to use a contraceptive in a liaison free of
marital obligation is not necessarily inherently affirming of socially cognizable
family values. But it is possible to see the sexual intimacy of an unmarried
couple as bearing some essential similarity to the marital intimacy long and
universally valued as a central element of family life. The claims in Eisenstadt
and Carey were thus claims to facilitate intimate human connection-a
connection that, at least under the right circumstances, might express values
of love and commitment that were recognizable, even if unconventional. It
may be unwise to read too much into his ambivalent assent in these cases
because for Justice White, these were clearly a close call. But his willingness
to strike down broad barriers to non-marital contraceptive use, while
pointedly not opening the door to aggressive judicial scrutiny of all state
regulation of consensual sexual conduct, suggests that privacy protection
might extend only to acts of non-marital intimacy deemed to share in the core
values of familial commitment.
This theory might help to explain Justice White's rejection of the privacy
claim in Bowers. Of course, as the Court's recent decision in Lawrence v.
Texas," ' demonstrates, it is entirely possible to see core similarities between
the sexual intimacy experienced by gays and lesbians and that experienced
by heterosexuals, including the non-marital heterosexual intimacy
facilitated by Eisenstadtand Carey. To be sure, Michael Hardwick did
assert a claim to intimate human association, not isolation or
individuation.' Yet it seems likely that, for Justice White (as apparently
for Justice Powell), the same-sex liaison at issue was so far outside his ken
of family experience that he could not imagine the substantial
commonalities. This is suggested by his confident assertion in Bowers.
[It is] evident that none of the rights announced [in the Court's
previous family-privacy cases] bears any resemblance to the
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy . . . . No connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other
has been demonstrated .... 0
At least in the realm of non-marital heterosexual unions, the Justices had
ready models available that suggested the essential "resemblance" to more
conventional marital intimacy: the Caban family, for instance, or the
Stanleys-families that had built lives together and formed enduring
commitments that society could recognize as basically good and honorable,
168.

123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).

169.
170.

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188, 191 (1985).
Id. at 190-91.
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even if sub-optimal. Even if society were prepared to disfavor or
discourage these arrangements, it was not hard to see that they shared with
conventional families certain core qualities and values. For some of the
Justices at the time of Bowers, however, these commonalities were much
more obscure in the case of same-sex relationships. Certainly, public
models of stable, committed, durable same-sex families were much less
available at the time the Justices acted. And it surely did not help the cause
that the particular facts of Hardwick involved a transitory encounter that
completely lacked the "emotional attachments . . . derive[d] from the
intimacy of daily association," traits that defined a socially valuable family
in some previous cases."'
The same considerations help to explain Justice White's staunch rejection
of heightened constitutional protection for abortion. By the approach
suggested here, a woman's liberty interest in abortion could be seen as not
just lacking core values of family, but as antithetical to them. The claimants
White favored in cases involving marriage, childrearing, and even
contraception could be understood to be asserting an interest in intimate,
durable association connoting family. In the abortion cases, however,
White perceived the claim to be one for disassociation, individuation, and
the avoidance of durable human connection. For Justice White, abortion
was a quest for escape from family ties, "typically involv[ing] the
destruction of another entity: the fetus," and this made the abortion
decision "different in kind from the others that the Court has protected
under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy."'' Despite
superficial commonalities between the abortion decision and "the decisions
protected in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey," as each "concern[ed]
childbearing (or, more generally, family life)," for Justice White, the cases
were crucially distinguished by the "value[s]" underlying the two sorts of
claims.'73 In the case of abortion, "the continuing and deep division of the
that the value
people themselves over the question" precluded a conclusion
174
choice to permit abortion was constitutionally controlled.
Finally, Mooremight seem somewhat harder to square with this rationale
for privacy rights. After all, Inez Moore asserted a claim to intimate human
171. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 844. For factual background on Hardwick, see JOYCE
MURDOCH & DEB PRICE, COURTING JUSTICE 278-79 (2001).

172. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,792 (1986)
(White, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 792 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). He recommended a similar judgment in
discussing the fundamental right of childrearing, suggesting that abusive parental discipline

should not be considered within "the scope of the [protected] liberty interest" because the

"very nature" of such an assault was at war with the values that make the parent-child bond

especially valuable. Id. at 793 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 793 (White, J., dissenting).
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connection that obviously involved the sort of commitments and mutual
obligation that lies at the core of any desirable notion of family. 7 5 She
sought to help raise her grandchildren in an arrangement that, as Justice
Powell's plurality opinion pointed out, society had long recognized as
valuable and even noble.'76 It appears, however, that Justice White's
reluctance to strike down the zoning ordinance had more to do with a
practical assessment of the burden imposed on the Moore family than with
any doubts about whether their bonds really qualified as fami/yprotected
by the Constitution. In Thornburgh, White suggested that determining
whether a liberty interest is "fundamental" turned in this context both on its
substantiality to the persons affected and on a judgment that the "value[s]"
expressed by the interest are discernable within the constitutional scheme. 7
In Moore, White simply concluded that the burden imposed by the zoning
law on the Moore family was not very substantial.' First, he emphasized
that the ordinance did not purport to separate Mrs. Moore from allof her
grandchildren, only some7-and only then after leaving open numerous
alternative household configurations.' 80 Second, Justice White noted that
Mrs. Moore could escape even that burden by moving her family a mile or
two in any direction, since the ordinance applies "only in East Cleveland, an
area with a radius of three miles and a population of 40,000. The ordinance
thus denies appellant the opportunity to live with all her grandchildren
[only] in this particular suburb; she is free to do so in other parts of the
Cleveland metropolitan area.'. It appears that, for Justice White, Mrs.
Moore's interests failed to trigger heightened privacy protection not
because her caregiving relationship with her grandsons lacked the values of
durable commitment that distinguish family, but rather because the state's
burden on Mrs. Moore's family interests was simply too small to justify
overcoming the powerful presumption in favor of democratic judgment.

III. PRIVACY AND THE VIRTUES OF PRAGMATISM
So far, I have suggested only that Justice White's decisions relating to the
constitutional right of privacy were neither reactionary nor unprincipled, as
many critics have contended. More than that, however, there is much in
White's methodology that is affirmatively worthy of praise and emulation. Its

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,550-51 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
See id.at 504-05 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
See Thornburgh,476 U.S. at 792 n.2, 796 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
See Moore, 431 U.S. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
See id.at 549 (White, J., dissenting) (doubting the substantiality of private interest in

"liv[ing] with all, rather than some, of one's grandchildren").
180. See id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
181.

Id.
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elements- restraint grounded in sincere respect for the primacy of democratic
choice, realism about the necessity for normative judicial judgment in
delineating the limits of democratic authority, and a pragmatic commitment
to cautious, fact-focused, case-by-case adjudication-provide the best means
for avoiding the pitfalls of both judicial and democratic excess. For those who
desire an honest and responsibly progressive approach to constitutional
protection in this area, Justice White's methodology may not merely be
defensible, but indeed be the best thing going.
A. Legitimacy and Transparencyin the Search for Constitutional Values
At the broadest level, White's approach to constitutional privacy
recognizes-as society itself always has-that family is specially valuable
and worthy of heightened public respect. In tying judicial intervention
under the guise of substantive due process to the social good of family, White
also recognized that not all private assertions or conceptions of family are
equally deserving of public deference. The private interest in a casual
sexual encounter, in walking away from a marriage, or in abusing a child
need not be regarded neutrally nor as equivalent to the desire to marry, to
procreate, or to nurture a child.
This sense of nuance about the range of interests relating to family or
intimate association is surely desirable from almost any perspective in
defining the boundaries of family privacy. There is wide consensus todayas there always has been-that the content of family life should not be left
entirely to the self-defining choices of individuals. 8' A "view of the family
only as a collection of individuals who come together in a contractarian
arrangement for so long and for such purposes as they choose," Lee
Teitelbaum once observed, is "deeply unsatisfying" because it "leaves little
room for the sense of commitment experienced by and valued in family
life."' 83 Indeed, as Martha Minow has pointed out, "[t]he danger of an
expansive, functional voluntarist view of family-in which people can pick
and choose what kinds of family ties that they want to have -is that people
will choose to walk out when it gets tough and to avoid responsibilities
when it is no longer fun."' As a result, "[t]he government will not and
cannot be neutral about family duties." ' Family is distinctively valuable
182. See David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family,86
MINN.L. REV. 791,830-31 (2002); Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the
21st Century?,50 AM. J. COMP. L. 101,116-20 (2002).
183. Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Familyas a System:A PreliminarySketch, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 537,545, 554.
184. Martha Minow, RedefiningFamilies Who's In and Who's Out? 62 U. COLO.L. REV.
269, 283 (1991).
185. Martha Minow, Allin the Family&InAlFamilies:Membership,Loving, andOwing,
95 W. VA. L. REV. 275,329 (1993).
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not merely as a location where individuals happen to realize particularly
strong self-regarding impulses, but for the uniquely powerful social benefits
generated by certain, sometimes selfless forms of intimate association.
Accordingly, identifying what society truly values about family-love,
durability, commitment, the fulfillment of dependence-may be a means of
determining which relationships
should qualify for heightened
87
constitutional protection.1

Crucially, for Justice White, what distinguished these varied intereststhe aspiration to parenthood from the casual sexual encounter, for
example - and the legitimacy of their claim to constitutional protection, was
not the vicissitudes of historical practice, but some modernjudgment about
the constituent values of family. In rejecting protection for abortion or
homosexual intimacy, for example, it was not enough to point out that
society traditionallyhad not regarded these choices as beyond the purview
of government. l 8 Instead, it was necessary to establish that no present
social consensus so regarded these choices. In Bowers v. Hardwick, for
example, Justice White observed that about half the states continued to
criminalize sodomy,89 and in Thornburgh he emphasized "the continuing
and deep division of the people themselves over the question of abortion"''
as precluding special constitutional protection. "[T]hat many men and
women of good will and high commitment to constitutional government
place themselves on both sides of the abortion controversy," White wrote,
"strengthens my own conviction that the values animating the Constitution
do not compel recognition of the abortion liberty as fundamental."' 9'
The focus on modern consensus, of course, leaves room to expand
constitutional protection as social attitudes relating to family evolve.
Justice White agreed, for example, in Loving v. Virginia' that the
186. Cf Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings:
DiscerningParenthoodin IrrationalActions,81 VA.L.REV. 2493 (1995).
187. See, e.g., Minow, Al/in the Family,supra note 185, at 305-10, 331 (suggesting that
family be defined by focusing upon the obligations implicit in family relations, under which the
state might be "generous" in permitting individuals to claim family status but "strict" in
enforcing the duties assigned to that status by public norms); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It
All Depends on What You Mean by Home": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the
"Nontraditional"Family,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 569,580-83 (proposing a functional definition of
family that would differentiate between "kinships of responsibility" and mere "associations of
choice").
188. This, by contrast, had seemed sufficient to Chief Justice Burger in Bowers. See 478
U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasizing the history of legal
prohibitions against homosexual conduct in Roman and English law).
189. See id. at 193-94.
190. 476 U.S. 747, 793 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 793-94.
192. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Constitution's
regard
for family • privacy
Virgnia
oulawinteracil
o
193 did not permit the people of
Virginia to outlaw interracial marriage. Although it was surely impossible
to say that society had historically agreed that the private choice of an
interracial couple to marry was beyond the legitimate purview of
government-at one time, a majority of states proscribed such marriagesit was obvious that such a consensus was emerging at the time the Court
acted. 94 Most states had abandoned their anti-miscegenation laws through
legislative or judicial action in the 1950s and early 1960s, so that when the
Court decided Lovingonly a relative handful of jurisdictions clung to their
statutory bans.'95 Under this approach, the judiciary is permitted to broaden
constitutional protection in step with changing social consensus about
family, but it may not get out in front of popular judgment. Courts may be
allowed to deliver the coup de grace to a traditional measure of family
regulation that was already facing overwhelming political pressure, as in
Loving, but would not lead the way if social judgment remained essentially
unsettled, as in Bowers.
A virtue of this approach is that it permits constitutional acknowledgment
of the changing reality of family life. A rigid focus on historical
understandings of family and the limits of governmental power, for
example, or an approach that limits constitutional protection to certain
bright-line categories like marriage or parenthood carries dual risks. First,
these approaches can ossify family law and preclude innovative democratic
responses to changing social conditions. Innovative responses to the
diversification of non-parent childrearing practices, for example, may be
stymied by a jurisprudence that fixes constitutional entitlement in a
traditional conception of parental privilege. Indeed, state courts following
such approaches have blocked a variety of efforts to protect the emotional
bonds that may develop between children and their non-parent caregivers
in non-traditional families.' 96

193.

Id. at 12.

194.

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEx MARRIAGE 157-59 &

n. c (1996) (surveying history of anti-miscegenation laws and noting that thirty states had such
laws at the end of the Second World War).
195. See Robert A. Pratt, Crossingthe ColorLine.A HistoricalAssessmentandPersonal
NarrativeofLoving v. Virginia, 41 HOw. L.J. 229,233-34 (1998) (noting that thirteen statesnearly half of those which had such laws- had repealed their anti-miscegenation laws between
1952 and 1967).
196. See David D. Meyer, What ConstitutionalLaw CanLearnfrom the ALIPrincilesof
FamilyDissolution,2001 BYU L. REV. 1075,1085-88 (asserting that many state courts would
likely invalidate some of the more innovative non-parent custody provisions proposed by the
American Law Institute); Meyer, supra note 120, at 782-92 (reviewing state court decisions
imposing narrow constitutional limits on legislative or judicial power to protect a child's
emotional bonds with non-parent caregivers in the face of objection by a legal parent, even
one with tenuous emotional ties to the child).
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At the same time, historical or categorical approaches to constitutional
protection risk validating democratic intrusions on non-traditional
relationships that, by current understandings, share the core values that
distinguish and privilege family life; this includes, of course, Mildred and
Richard Loving. Interestingly, it now might extend to John Lawrence and
Tyron Garner, the protagonists of Lawrence v. Texas.' 97 An approach to
fundamental-rights analysis tied exclusively to historical consensus, or that
assigns rights on the basis of some traditional categorization (such as
parenthoodor marriage),obviously cannot easily accommodate emerging
social values. One of the striking aspects of Justice White's approach, by
contrast, is that the methodology that produced Bowers in 1986 remains
perfectly consistent with Lawrence'soverruling of Bowersin 2003. In the
seventeen years since Bowerswas decided, there has been a significant and
obvious shift in public attitudes toward gays and lesbians. While there is
not yet public consensus that intimate same-sex relationships should be
treated as equivalent to intimate heterosexual relationships-a decided
majority still opposes permitting same-sex couples to marry, for example there may now be a strong social consensus that government has no
business criminalizing private, consensual sexual intimacy between gays and
lesbians. 5 Indeed, as a result of recent legislative repeals and state
constitutional decisions, the number of states with criminal sodomy laws
dwindled from twenty-four in 1986 to thirteen in 200399- slightly fewer
than the number of states that clung to their anti-miscegenation laws at the
time of Loving."" This data, to the extent it demonstrated a modern social
consensus that criminal regulation of same-sex intimacy was illegitimate,
would plainly have been relevant to Justice White in reassessing Bowers."'
Even if he had not considered that data persuasive of a sufficient consensus
in 2003, Justice White might well have been willing to do so by 2010 or 2015,
assuming that social attitudes continue to evolve on their current trajectory.
In this way, Justice White's methodology permits temperate innovations-

197. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475-76 (2003) (overruling Bowers and holding that a statute
criminalizing intimate sexual conduct between persons of the same sex was unconstitutional).
198. The emerging consensus suggested by polling data and other evidence is that, while
gays and lesbians should not be permitted to marry, the law should otherwise recognize the
legitimacy of their longterm, committed relationships. See, e.g., Meyer, Self-Definition,supra

note 182, at 799-800. That same attitude is reflected, of course, in the legal efforts of Vermont,
Hawaii, and California to extend most legal benefits of marriage-but notmarriage itself-to
stable same-sex unions. See id.; Gay Couples in CaliforniaAre Granted Wide Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21,2003, at A10.

199.
200.

See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481.
See Brief for Petitioners at 22-24 & n. 17, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex.

App. 2001) (No. 02-102, filed Jan. 16, 2003).

201. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-194 (1986) (taking note of the number of
states still criminalizing sodomy in 1986).
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both constitutional and legislative-in response to changing social
developments in family life, without unleashing judges to impose truly
ground-breaking values on the democratic process under the guise of
constitutional law.
Of course, this approach depends heavily upon subjective judgment. One
person's "temperate innovation" can be another's starry-eyed "social
engineering." For White, the line of demarcation rested on an assessment
that society had accepted that the asserted private interest or relationship
shared in the core values denoting family. However, he also was quick to
admit that this value judgment-identifying the core values that distinguish
family and the extent to which they are implicit in regulated conductwould be made by judges, and that judges inevitably would be influenced by
their own perspectives and values. 2°2 Realistically, no alternative existed.
For Justice White, with no true external constraint available in text, history,
or elsewhere, the only workable answer was to encourage judges to exercise
self-restraint. He sought to inculcate this norm of restraint by declaiming as
illegitimate direct reliance on judges' personal value preferences, by
encouraging a sense of genuine judicial humility, and by embracing
prudential devices that would generally minimize the scope and impact of
judicial intervention.
Justice White's devotion to pragmatic adjudication-especially to
cautious incrementalism in developing constitutional doctrine -reflected his
genuine respect for the primacy of democratic judgment. Justice White's
penchant for narrow judgments focusing upon record facts tended to
produce slow, tentative extensions of constitutional doctrine rather than
broad, dramatic pronouncements. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,for example,
where Justice Brennan was ready to declare the right of allpersons, married
or single, to autonomy in matters relating to contraception and sexuality,
Justice White believed that a quirk in the record-the prosecution had
failed to establish that the petitioners were not married-permitted a
decision based on a straightforward application of Griswold'sprotection of
marital privacy.
White's preference for modest holdings was, of course, calculated to
minimize judicial imposition upon democratic choice. This is not merely a
good in itself, but reflects understanding of the substantial risk of error in this
context and sensitivity to the costs of judicial miscalculation. Eisenstadt
illustrates that danger. Justice Brennan's broad and emphatic declaration of

202. See supranotes 102-05 and accompanying text.
203. Compare 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (majority opinion) with id. at 464-65 (White, J.,
concurring).
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constitutional privacy as a "right of the individua' 2 4 effected a substantial
Griswold described the privacy
recasting of Griswold v. Connecticut
2 6 Similarly,
valued by the Constitution as inhering in the maritalrelationship.
earlier cases - Meyer v. Nebraska,"7 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' Skinner v.
Oklahoma,2 °9 and Prince v. Massachusetts' -seemed to protect family
associations against external meddling by the state. In emphatically-and
unnecessarily-relocating the constitutional interest in the individual rather
than the family union, however, Eisenstadt opened the door to a host of
doctrinal and moral complexities. Most significantly, it created the possibility
that the Constitution might be invoked not merely collectively as a shield
against the state, but as a sword by an individual to resolve an intra-family
dispute. Today, for instance, constitutional privilege is routinely inveighed by
one family member against others in disputes over child custody or visitation,
sometimes
requiring courts to weigh competing claims of individual privacy
•. 211
rights.
This does not merely add new layers of complexity to judicial
decisionmaking, but it also introduces substantial questions about the
meaning of family, the durability of family ties, and even the future vitality of
the privacy interest itself.2" These are questions that eventually the Court
would be required to confront, but the breadth of Eisenstadfsreasoning and
rhetoric seemed to blunder past them without appreciating the implications.
Partly as a result, the right of family privacy is now sometimes employed to
compel state action to extinguish family ties in order to vindicate individual
claims to autonomy and self-determination, as in the contested adoption cases
involving Baby Jessica and Baby Richard.2 3 White's inclination toward
smaller steps in developing constitutional doctrine might have permitted the
204. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it isthe
right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.").
205. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:From
Griswold to Eisenstadt andBeyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1522,1543-46 (1994).
206. 381 U.S. at 485-86.
207. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
208. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
209. 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
210. 321 U.S. 158, 164-67 (1944).
211. See David D. Meyer, The ModestPromise of Children 'sRelationshipRights, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 1117,1127-29 (2003).
212. See Dolgin, supra note 205, at 1564-70 (suggesting that Eisenstadfs individualist
reconception of the privacy right might facilitate the erosion of family relationships and even
the eventual growth of totalitarianism as the family loses its capacity to mediate between
individuals and state power).
213. See In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111.
1995) (Baby Richard); In re
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (Baby Jessica); see also Meyer, Family Ties, supranote
120, at 766-69.
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Court to confront these questions in a more deliberate fashion, and perhaps
with less untoward results.
A final virtue of Justice White's privacy methodology is its comparative
honesty about the role of normative judgment in constitutional
decisionmaking. In this, too, White drew directly from the realist tradition."'
He saw-and acknowledged-that doctrinal commands that judges focus on
text or history scarcely eliminate room for value judgments in constitutional
interpretation. Text, of course, can provide no real constraint in the privacy
context. And, like Justice Black, White recognized that history is incapable of
neutrally and objectively cabining constitutional protection."' "What the
deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable," he noted, and "which
of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is even more
debatable."2 6' For White, determining whether a claimed private interest is
"deserv[ing]' of constitutional protection plainly required a value judgmenti.e., a conclusion that the interest corresponds sufficiently with "some value of
privacy or individual autonomy" attributable to the Constitution."' In
White's view, popular and judicial understanding of these values might
change over time. Equality, for example, quite appropriately came to mean
something different at the time of Brown v. BoardofEducation 8 than it did
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868."19 Similarly, common
understandings of family have evolved over time. Justice White found crucial
the concept that the people themselves had chosen through the Constitution
to curtail democratic incursions on equality or family, allowing the specific
meaning of "equality" or "family" to change over time. Judges were free to
keep pace with changing social understandings and, in doing so, could draw
their legitimacy from vindicating "the will of the people. 22 This was, White
frankly acknowledged, "a search for values," not an expert reading of history
or text.221
214. See DUXBURY, supra note 128, at 71 ("'Realism' describes accurately what was
possibly the single unifying ambition of so-called realists: namely, the commitment to candor,
to telling it - whatever 'it' happened to be - as it is.").
215. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-19 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(mocking the majority's notion that judges can disregard "'their personal and private notions'
in determining whether the "traditions [and collective] 'conscience of our people"' support
recognition of a non-textual fundamental right; "the scientific miracles of this age have not yet
produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the
'[collective] conscience of our people"') (quoting id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
216. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
217. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

218. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
219.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 796 n.5.

220. Id.
221. Id.
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Nor was White unaware that judges, in conducting this search, would
unavoidably be affected by their own perspectives, experiences, and values.
The only reasonable expectation, then, was that judges be alert to their
own biases and do the best they could to make an honest appraisal of social
consensus respecting the values of family. Obviously, no guarantee exists in
such a formula that judges will not overstep their authority, and that
undoubtedly leaves many theorists deeply unsatisfied. Pragmatists such as
Justice White, however, are more inclined to accept such imperfections as
the best that can be had in the real world. Indeed, there is surely much to
admire in the frank acknowledgment that constitutional adjudication in this
area rests ultimately on value judgments made by judges, with all the
dangers and pitfalls that task presents.
Although Justice White's methodology deserves credit for admitting the
role of normative judgment, his opinions in individual cases were sometimes
properly faulted for not being more transparent. White's devotion to brevity
in opinions was famous and quite consistent with his commitment to finding
narrow bases for decision in constitutional cases-both reflected an overall
desire to say as little as possible in the course of constitutional adjudication. 222
Yet, while his restraint in drawing new constitutional lines was generally
admirable, White's sparse explanations of the Court's reasoning in opinions
too often led to confusion and suspicion among readers, obscuring, rather
than illuminating, the basis of the Court's judgments.223
Still, notwithstanding the flaws of his opinion-writing in specific cases,
Justice White's methodologyin privacy cases was refreshingly honest about
the place of value judgments in deciding constitutional cases. Even greater
frankness by the Court, in acknowledging forthrightly the specific value
judgments which animate its privacy decisions, would prove beneficial not
only to public understanding of the Court's work, but also in spurring public
debate over the specific values in question. That debate might help
generate-or disprove-social consensus about family relevant to future
decisions and might also prod the democratic process to be more responsive
to new facts and understandings.
B. The Court's EmergingAcceptance of the PragmaticApproach
In the decade since Justice White's retirement, evidence shows that the
Court may be moving closer to his pragmatic model for privacy adjudication.
Ironically, the first evidence may be found in the joint opinion of Justices

222.

See HUTCHINSON, supranote 5, at 418-19 (describing White's self-imposed twelve-

page limit for most majority opinions); id. at 374 (describing White's majority opinions as
typically "adopt[ing] a faceless, restless style that resolved the case and drew as little attention
to themselves as possible").
223. See Liebman, supra note 136, at 19.
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O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, decided
only a year before Justice White left the Court. Although White vehemently
disagreed with Caseys result-the reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade21 -the
methodology employed by the authors of the joint opinion bore some
important similarities to that used by Justice White. First, the joint authors
squarely rejected text or enactment-era traditions as the sole determinants of
the fundamental liberty protected by substantive due process.226 Indeed, the
plurality rejected the notion that any single formula could neatly describe the
Court's role in identifying fundamental rights, and adopted Justice Harlan's
227
view, articulated in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
that "[n]o formula could
serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint., 228 The joint
authors, like Justice Harlan, required "'reasoned judgment,"' which would
have regard for text, history and tradition, but that ultimately rested on an
229
appraisal of the fundamental values of the nation. Second, the joint authors
embraced a standard for evaluating government incursions on the abortion
right-the "undue burden" test-which was calculated to permit a flexible
230
balancing of the competing private and public interests.
Five years later, Justice Souter elaborated upon this approach in
explaining his understanding of substantive due process in Washington v.
Glucksberg. In Glucksberg,Souter stated that substantive due process
review "calls for a court to assess the relative 'weights' or dignities of the
contending interests" in an effort to identify "the values [which] ... truly
deserv[e] constitutional stature. '' 21 2 Also adopting Justice Harlan's
formulation from Poe,Justice Souter wrote that these values were not to be
drawn simply from the "'personal and private notions' of judges, but were
"those exemplified by 'the traditions from which [the Nation] developed,' or
revealed by contrast with 'the traditions from which it broke.' 233 This did
not mean that history fixed the values protected by substantive due process;
to the contrary, the tradition guiding the Court was "'a living thing ' ' 23 4 that
was continually shaped and remade by contemporary public debates. For
instance, in concluding that the Constitution did not afford heightened

224. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
225. See id. at 869 ("We conclude that ... Roe was based on a constitutional analysis
which we cannot now repudiate.").
226. Id. at 847-48.
227. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
228. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

229.
230.
231.
232.

See Casey,505 U.S. at 849; Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring).

233.
234,

Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 765 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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protection to the respondents' interest in physician-assisted suicide, Justice
Souter did not consider it determinate that society had not historically
afforded such a liberty; 235 rather, what was ultimately controlling was that
society was still actively wrestling with the implicit value choices and
experimenting with public responses."'
Next, in weighing the justification for public intrusions on these
constitutional values, Justice Souter insisted that courts should proceed
flexibly and cautiously.27 Courts have no warrant, he wrote, to overturn
democratic policy choices that are within "the zone of what is
2
reasonable., 38
Like White, Souter believed that deference to reasonably
debatable policy judgments is crucial to ensure proper respect for the
primacy of democratic choice. Accordingly, though Justice Souter accepted
"the so-called 'compelling interest test"' as the governing standard in cases
of fundamental rights,29 he did not have in mind Professor Gunther's rigid
conception of strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact, 240 but
rather a decidedly more nuanced and flexible standard of review, which
would adjust its justificatory demands according to the particular strength of
the private interest at stake and the extent of the government's intrusion.241
In the end, Justice Souter did not rule out the possibility that physicianassisted suicide might be entitled to heightened constitutional protection,
but concluded that "[t]he Court should... stay its hand to allow reasonable
242
legislative consideration" to continue. This approach, both to identifying
the values specially protected by the Constitution and defining the
permissible intrusions upon those values, reflects an essentially pragmatic
understanding of privacy adjudication.
Perhaps the clearest affirmation of Justice White's pragmatic approach,
however, can be seen in Troxel v. Granville.243 In Troxel, the Court
overturned a trial court's order permitting grandparents to visit with their
granddaughters over the objection of their mother.24 The case seemed an
235. See id.at 773-74.
236. See id.at 785-89.
237.

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767-68 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).

238. Id. at 768.
239. Id. at 772 n.12.
240. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court1971 Term - Foreword:In Search ofEvolving
Doctrineon a ChangingCourt.:A Model fora Ne wer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1,8
(1972).
241. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 772 n.12 (Souter, J., concurring) ("How compelling the

interest and how narrow the tailoring must be will depend, of course, not only on the
substantiality of the individual's own liberty interest, but also on the extent of the burden
placed upon it.").

242. Id.
at 789.
243.

530 U.S. 57 (2000).

244. Id. at 62.
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easy one from many conventional perspectives. The trial court had acted
pursuant to a Washington state statute that authorized courts to grant
visitation to "any person" at "any time" upon a finding that visitation would
serve a child's best interests. 245 The mother's liberty interest in rearing her
children enjoyed deep historical validation, and the expansive statute
seemed poorly drawn to survive strict scrutiny.
Tellingly, however, the Court did not strike the statute.14' Eight of the
Justices agreed that the trial court's visitation order burdened Tommie
Granville's fundamental right as a parent to rear her children, 247and yet only
one-Justice Thomas-went on to subject the statute to strict scrutiny.248
Most of the others seemed intent to proceed cautiously. The plurality
opinion authored by Justice O'Connor was willing only to hold that the
Washington statute had been unconstitutionally applied on the facts of the
Granville family's case. 2 9 Justices Stevens and Kennedy, each writing
separately, Cour
were
unwilling
to go even •that•250
far, instead insisting that the
emad
shuld
fo futher
Court should remand for further fact-finding. All sensed the danger of
broad constitutional pronouncements-particularly ones grounded in
traditional notions of family privilege-for a society in which "[t]he
demographic changes of the past century make it difficult [even] to speak of
an average American family."251 As Justice Kennedy explained, the danger
of a broad constitutional rule giving parents the power to cut off contacts
with "third parties" is that such a rule:
[P]roceed[s] from the assumption that the parent or parents who
resist visitation have always been the child's primary caregivers
and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate
and established relationship with the child ....As we all know,

this is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many
households. For many boys and girls a traditional family with two
or even one permanent and caring parent is simply not the reality
of their childhood.252
This awareness of the changing reality of family life seemed to push all but
Justice Thomas (and Justice Scalia, who believed that no fundamental right
was implicated in the first instance) to employ a more modest, flexible

245.

Id.at 61.
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247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See id. at 74-75.
See id at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000).
Id.at 84-85, 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 63 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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standard of review. The plurality, for instance, would say only that the
Constitution required trial judges to give "special weight" to a parent's own
assessment of her child's best interests before reaching a contrary decision,
and that the trial court's failure to do so in this case invalidated its order.5
Left expressly undecided was whether a more stringent showing of harm to
the child might also be necessary and whether the statute might be facially
unconstitutional.
The Justices' evident determination in Troxelto decide the case on the
narrowest possible grounds, leaving room for democratic experimentation
in response to complex social issues and carving out flexibility for future
courts in mediating conflicts between family members over children, closely
resembles Justice White's instincts for cautious, fact-focused, pragmatic
review."' The Justices' concern that constitutional doctrine develop in
small steps, both to avoid unwarranted interference with democratic choice
and to ensure sensitivity to changing social realities and attitudes, likewise
corresponds with White's own twin commitments to judicial restraint and
realism about the inevitable need for modern judgments about the
prevailing values of family.
Finally, and paradoxically, even Lawrence v. Texas' provides significant
validation for White's privacy methodology. That claim may appear farfetched given that Lawrence chastises Justice White by name for his flawed
historiography in BowerW'7 and concludes sharply that "Bowers was not
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today., 5 8 Yet, it is possible
to see the outcomes in Bowers and Lawrence as the products of different
facts, rather than different constitutional methodologies. In Bowers,White
found no fundamental right because he could see no "resemblance" between
the sexual intimacy shared by a same-sex couple and the relationships and
undertakings previously deemed to share in the core values of family, and
because there was no social consensus suggesting such a commonality.! In
Lawrence,the Court found constitutional protection for same-sex intimacy at
least partly because the Justices in 2003 saw the "resemblance" to family
intimacy that had eluded White. "When sexuality finds overt expression in
intimate conduct with another person," the Court observed, "the conduct can

253. For amplification of this argument, see David D. Meyer, LochnerRedeemed:Family
PrivacyAfterTroxel andCarhart,48 UCLA L. REV. 11125, 1140-55 (2001).
254. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
255. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
256. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
257. Id. at 2480.

258. See id.at 2484.
259.

SeeBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986); see alsosupranotes 169-71 and

accompanying text.
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be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. ''2' Lawrence's
readiness to draw analogies to marriage reinforced the linkage between
sexuality and enduring personal bonds: "To say that the issue in Bowerswas
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
'
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."261
In
Lawrence, then, as in Griswold, constitutional protection was ultimately
founded not upon a sex act, but upon the existence of a durable "personal
relationship.,

262

There was, moreover, an "emerging recognition" by society

that this relationship is legitimate and beyond the coercive power of the
state. 263 Of course, this conclusion was founded partly on developments
occurring since 1986, such as the repeal or invalidation on state constitutional
grounds of nearly half the sodomy laws upon which White had relied in
Bowers.26 None of this is to say that White would have joined the Court's
opinion in Lawrence. Certainly, he would have had serious qualms about the
breadth of Justice Kennedy's opinion and its description of the historical
record concerning legal proscriptions against homosexual conduct. 261 Yet, the

core methodological commonalities of Bowers and Lawrence are surely
greater than Justice Kennedy appreciates. Both White and Kennedy
considered it important to determine whether the private interest at stake
shared in the essential values that privileged family intimacy and both looked
to modern social consensus on the question as an important source of
validation for this judgment. Although they came to different conclusions
because of different understandings of the facts, both asked the same
questions. In that sense, Lawrence provides essential affirmation of White's
privacy methodology, even as it discards the result that methodology
produced in Bowers.
IV. CONCLUSION

In Justice White's view, the legitimacy of judicial intervention in defense of
unwritten privacy rights depended upon the honest attribution of the value
choices inherent in privacy protection to the people, rather than to judges.
Yet Justice White was under no delusions that this approach somehow
eliminated the need for normative judgment by judges in the course of

260. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 2480-81; see also id.at 2480 (asserting that the "laws and traditions in the
past half-century... show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex").
264. See id.at 2481.
265. See id.at 2478-82.
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defining the boundaries of privacy protection. To the contrary, judges would
still be called upon to decide whether the privacy interests asserted in a given
case shared in the essential qualities and values that distinguished and
privileged familylife by common understanding. As a realist, Justice White
understood that judges would inevitably be influenced by their own
experiences and world views in making this estimation. Yet, Justice White's
point was that they were obligated to do the best they could to relate
constitutional intervention to what they took to be the values of the people.
At its core, this was both the great difficulty of Justice White's approach
and its great virtue. By eschewing a singular focus on the purported
objectivity of text or history, Justice White's approach promised no
guarantee that the Court's judgments would not be influenced by the biases
and values of the judges themselves. Yet, by insisting that value choices
may not be attributed directly to judges, Justice White's approach would
not permit judgments based simply on a frank judicial balancing of the
private and public interests. His approach required some middle course
that, from the vantage point of some, might seem impossibly messy or even
inherently contradictory. By its nature, however, pragmatism is prepared to
tolerate the tensions between tradition and innovation, between restraint
and intervention, and to recognize that the tension is not soluble by any
neat theoretical fix.
Instead, Justice White's pragmatic approach conceded the inevitability of
normative judgment - identifying the values constituting the indispensable
core of the social institution of family-and denied the existence of any
magic bullet, in the form of text, history, or theory, that might vanquish the
genuine evil of judicial overreaching. His approach leaves open to debate
what are the core family values that society believes should be protected
against government incursion. In Justice White's view, those core values
seemed to require some positive aspiration to association, to durable
intimacy, and to mutual obligation and the fulfillment of dependency. And,
yet, Justice White the realist would have readily acknowledged the
possibility of other points of view. More importantly, Justice White
acknowledged that the legitimate participants in this debate included not
only the Constitution's Framers, or the current occupants of the Supreme
Court bench, but also the millions of other actors who comprise American
democracy. Justice White's methodology did not purport to fix the answers,
but it directed judges toward the right questions. And that is probably the
most that can be hoped for in this extremely difficult area.

